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Abstract  
 
This thesis centers on the competitions between enterprises in the steel industry in China 
after the SOE (state-owned enterprises) reform, which can be viewed as a case for mass 
economic reforms within Chinese Leviathan. To examine the effect of  the SOE reform 
on the distributional benefits within actors of  state-owned and private enterprises, 
Knight’s relative bargaining power theory is served as the theoretic foundation. 
Ownership, is equally as two other explanatory predictor, labor force proportion and 
enterprise profit per capita as the operationalization of  inputs in gaining asymmetric 
resource (production capacity quota) for players of  enterprises in the steel industry. 
Empirical results from data collected in field work indicate that (1) ownership matters 
only when interactive with economic performance and PEs take the advantage of  
ownership; (2) regardless of  ownership, enterprises gain relative bargaining power when 
they do contribution to the social stability. Qualitative analysis from the interviews in 
fields also explains the results with cases.
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 1 
I. Introduction 
 
Since Soviet Union and Eastern European communist regimes collapsed in 
succession at the end of  the Cold War, issues relevant to deregulation and privatization 
of  state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in post-socialist reforms of  these countries have been 
increasingly discussed. Specifically, China’s great achievements in economic development 
in later 30 years draw attentions from many Chinese and foreign scholars to investigation 
on the transitional role of  China’s SOEs (see Shirk 1994, Zhang 1997, Steinfeld 1998 and 
Kennedy 2005). Their works mainly focus on the political logic of  economic reform 
policy making in these industries, especially how the whole group of  continuing 
politically influential SOEs performs in an expected market-oriented competition with 
rivals of  private enterprises (PEs) and foreign-invested enterprises. Although literature 
acknowledges the competitive mechanism of  the market economy in China’s economic 
reform, most scholars still hold conservative attitudes towards the extent to which these 
heavy industrial SOEs the obey the rules of  a free market and fair competitions as well as 
government’s ambiguous role as both owner of  SOEs and supervisor of  the 
competition.  
While the ideology of  general equilibrium theory (L. Walras, 1874) is widely 
applied to general explanations on the transitional business-government relations with 
Chinese characteristics in this post-socialist economic reform, some political economists 
study the privatization of  SOEs in the reform and try to find the partial equilibrium at 
micro-level. Zhang (1997) is the first domestic scholar who argues the privatization of  
SOEs as a result of  decentralization and regional competitions. Steinfeld (1998) and 
Kennedy (2005) also begin to link different reform paths of  SOEs in China with their 
industrial characteristics. They specially focus on the reform in the commanding heights 
industrial that “controls the life-blood of  the national economy (kong zhi guo min jing ji 
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ming mai) and plays a leading role in economic development”1, such as the steel, electric 
power, communication, coal and mining industries. 
So how about the privatization of  SOEs in these heavy industries at the 
micro-level? Are they become more competitive and profitable in the market arena? For 
their private rivals in these industries, does the effective economic reform bring them 
more power in the market competition because they honestly follow the rule of  profit 
maximization? What are their characteristics of  the business-government relations in the 
transitional stage for both SOEs and PEs? This thesis makes some preliminary 
explorations on the privatization of  SOEs in the steel industry in China and the pattern 
of  competitions between SOEs and PEs given a series of  external constraints from the 
government. 
 
A. Literature Review on History and Status Quo  
The founding People’s Republic of  China established a Soviet-type centrally 
planned economy, which is also called a “command economy”. China’s command 
economy is featured by the state ownership of  industrial enterprises with an extensive 
growth strategy designed to achieve high rates of  growth and establish a heavy industrial 
base. (Brown & Neuberger, 1968; Ward, 1980). Since the Chinese Communist Party 
(CCP) made the decision to launch the Economic Reform and Openness Policy in their 
Third Plenary Session of  the 11th Central Committee of  CCP in 1978, reforms in 
agriculture, collective and private business, labor incentives and foreign investment and 
trade have stimulated the Chinese domestic economy and provided support for the 
industrial reform drive. Nonetheless, the path of  China’s industrial reform is much 
                                                        
1 This interpretation is from the text in the Report Delivered at the 15th National Congress of  
the Communist Party of  China on September 12, 1997, Jiang Zemin. 
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rockier than the path taken by reforms in other area (Shirk, 1994). Industrial reforms, 
especially those in the commanding heights domain, are inherently redistributive and ran 
up against opposition from powerful central bureaucracies who see nothing 
objectionable about the other kinds of  reforms listed before. Steinfeld (1998) ascribed 
China’s ailing SOEs in the steel industry to the ambiguous property rights and the 
absence of  the final authorized proxy based on his three case studies, viewing China as a 
troubled transitional nation in post-socialist reforms.  
Even though further economic reform in heavy industries still hurt interests of  
political elites in China, CCP was very conscious with the growing burden from gigantic 
corporations in these industries as a potential threat to the achievements of  market 
economy. A deliberate of  economic restructuring policy, especially its core spirit of  “well 
managing large enterprises while adopting a flexible policy toward small ones” (zhua da 
fang xiao) on SOEs, was clearly initiated at the 15th National Congress of  CCP in fall 
1997. The economic restructuring strategy, after the Economic Reform and Openness 
Policy in 1978, further legalized and expanded the growth of  PEs in China’s heavy 
industries. Although Kennedy’s (2005) field studies on the business-government relations 
still emphasized the asymmetric strength between SOEs and PEs in the steel industry, his 
literature and cases implied that PEs did have a growing important role in the state 
policy-making and began to seek for the business lobby to protect their self-interests. 
Although data indicates that steel SOEs accounts for 12.3% in all enterprises but 
contributes 56.8% of  national production at the end of  2003; meanwhile, statistics from 
China Markets Yearbook in 2005 also shows that, among all 2,429 firms in the steel 
smelting and steel rolling subsectors, only 5% are SOEs and the collective-owned 
enterprises account for 16%.  
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As a crucial strategy in the “national policy” of  Economic Reform and 
Openness Policy, China had applied to reconvert her status of  a signatory in the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) since 1986 and finally became a new member 
of  the World Trade Organization (WTO)2 on December 11, 2001. China became 
world’s largest steel producer in 1996 and world’s largest steel consumer in 2001. The 
membership in WTO benefits China’s steel exports with reciprocal treatment from other 
member countries with a reduction in tariffs as well as non-tariff  barriers on exports 
(Fernandez, 2007). As the inexpensive labor force and land costs assist with the export 
of  low-end steel products, China has been the largest steel exporter in the world since 
the first half  of  2006.  
China’s steel industry, which used to be the staggering commanding heights in 
the public domain and competitions with PEs were rare, now becomes prosperous and 
even globally influential. For most of  enterprises in this industry, as long as they produce 
qualifies steel productions, the domestic and international market has an abundant 
capacity to consume, which brings the production capacity of  enterprises to a crucial role 
for their economic benefits. For two major actors, SOEs and PEs, whether it is a win-win 
situation or their strength go wax and wane in a zero-sum game during the transitional 
period? Furthermore, how do they react to do a competition for gaining the production 
capacity? 
Although Chinese government advocates the market economy much, the 
National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) still formulates strict 
industries polices for all the enterprises in these “commanding heights” industries as an 
                                                        
2 The 75 GATT members and the European Communities became the founding members of  
the WTO on January 1, 1995. The contracting parties who founded the WTO ended official 
agreement of  the "GATT 1947" terms in the end of  1995. Whereas GATT was a set of  rules 
agreed upon by nations, the WTO is an institutional body. expanded its scope from traded goods 
to trade within the service sector and intellectual property rights.  
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external supervisor. The regulation of  production capacity in the steel industry is a 
crucial aspect that determines the economic performance directly and reflects the 
production potential for enterprises. Renamed in 2003 as a successor of  the State 
Planning Commission and State Development Planning Commission that previously 
managed China’s Soviet-type “command economy”, NDRC has principle functions3 in 
formulating and implementing macro-economic policies, monitoring and adjusting the 
performance of  the national economy, examining and approving major construction 
projects and so forth.   
 
Economists who are interested in the central planned economy and its 
transition study China’s steel industry most in common literatures. They do analysis and 
descriptions on a chronically basis with detailed narrations. Hogan is one of  them and 
his book (1999) on the present status and future potential of  the steel industry discusses 
the growth of  state-owned enterprises mainly, predicts a crude steel production of  
124-130 million of  ton by the year 2020 and a prosperous steel industry in the 21st 
century (Hogan, 62). Written in mid 1990s, this book has anticipated a great 
consumption need for serving nation’s infrastructure and a catalyst for the growth of  
industrial activities (Hogan, 55-57).  
Political scientists also have explorations on this topic and their works are 
contemporary. Steinfeld (1998) is a pioneer working on the “post-socialist enterprises 
reform” in China. He tests institutional tools of  property rights theory and concludes its 
disability on explaining transitional systems and large industrial producers (Steinfeld, 
38-44). He also does fieldwork and case studies for three giant SOEs in China to observe 
                                                        
3 Information source of  the principle functions of  NDRC is from its official website at 
http://en.ndrc.gov.cn/brief/default.htm. This also can be obtained from the annual report from 
its parent agency of  State Council. 
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the commanding heights in transition and gets a touch of  pessimistic feelings on 
destructive state-intervention for these SOEs (Steinfeld, 249-255). Kennedy (2005) 
investigates the SOE reform in a different view. His field work emphasizes on the 
business lobby of  newly acceding private enterprises. Kennedy also starts to bring the 
environmental protection issue (89-93) to the bunch of  constrains that influences on the 
business-government relations in heavy industries in China, and concludes large SOEs 
still get some exemptions to due to their relative political influences over PEs. My thesis 
entitled “Bargaining in the Chinese Leviathan” as an echo to Yang’s (2004) “Remaking 
the Chinese Leviathan”. His works doesn’t merely centers on a certain economic factors 
in China but discuss the politics of  governances under market transition era since SOE 
reform (year of  1997 to 2003) as a whole. When mingled with market incentives, 
government makes formal and informal adjustments to institutional changes, with the 
purpose of  maintaining authoritarian rule while implementing economic reform (21-24). 
Yang’s work provides me with an economic and political frame and an external 
prospective from the counterpart of  enterprises, the government. 
 
B. Research Question and Some Remarks 
Emergence of  institutional arrangements, the SOE reform with economic 
restructuring policy in 1997 seems to be of  great significance to the advancement of  the 
industry; nonetheless, this argument will be far from reliable without supporting. Knight 
(1992) develops his theories on the bargaining and asymmetries of  power in institutional 
changes and argues that the key feature of  the bargaining theory of  institutional 
emergence is the fundamental relationship between resource asymmetries. Mainly based 
on Knight’s theories, this thesis will specifically answer the research question that: How 
does the pattern of  resource asymmetries between state-owned enterprises and private 
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enterprises with supervision from National Development and Reform Commission 
change in the steel industry in China?  
Previous work either emphasis on the role of  ownership alone for enterprises 
in the competition subsidy from government, or set SOEs and PEs as individual groups 
to do separate studies. When focus on the political logic of  SOE reforms, economic 
logic of  these enterprises as seekers for profit maximization is sometimes absent. I did 
field work and research for thesis in China in summer 2008 and early spring 2009 for 
data collection and interviews. This paper discusses the role of  ownership and economic 
performance for both all the enterprises as a whole group, and makes comparison 
between these two types of  enterprises. NDRC is captured as an agent for the “Chinese 
Leviathan”, the government, which supervises business factors while keeps trying to 
separate business from government. The reform, competitions, and 
business-government relation in the steel industry, is described as a case for analysis on 
the procedure of  remaking “Chinese Leviathan”.  
Additionally, this work uses mixed methods with quantitative studies and 
qualitative analysis, combing statistical descriptions and inferences for first-hand data 
from filed work in China and literally explanations of  interviews with workers, managers 
at enterprises, and officials in local government. 
 
II. Theories 
Based on the literature review and background retrospection of  the general 
research question, this thesis explains the changing pattern in China’s steel industry and 
the business-government relations as results of  the institutional changes brought by 
China’s economic reform, especially the SOE reform started in 1997. Before discussing 
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in detail the actors of  SOEs and PEs as well as the dual-role of  NDRC as an agent of  
government, I would like to focus on the groundbreaking works of  Knight (1992) and 
North (1990) to build a theoretical foundation for further studies. Interpretations on 
these theories in the research questions provide a guideline to generate a clear hypothesis 
and good measurements for the variables.  
 
A. Institutions, Path Dependence and Relative Bargaining Power Theory 
North defines institutions as “the rules of  the game in a society or, formally, 
are the humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction” (1990, 3). Both 
formal rules and informal rules and the type and effectiveness of  enforcement shape the 
whole character of  the game. North argues that institutions affect the performance of  
economy by their effect on the costs of  exchange4 and production. This is the 
conception of  transaction costs in new institutional economy, which is initiated by Coase 
(1937) and widely known through Williamson (1981) and Cheung (1987). North uses 
transaction costs to explain the path of  institutional change. When the incomplete 
market and fragmentary information feedback are characterized by significant transaction 
costs, the historically derived perceptions of  the actors shape the choices that they make 
and there exists the path dependence (North, 1990, 93-94). Different from Shirk’s (1994) 
political logic of  the economic reform in China, North’s path dependence theory 
provides the economic logic to economic issues of  the lagged reactions of  sectors in 
“command economy” to the post-socialist reforms. Specially, this provides explanations 
                                                        
4 Douglass North is the co-recipient of  1993’s Nobel Prize in Economics and his studies 
concentrate on the area of  Institutional economics and economic history. His works are essential 
part of  the foundation for the theoretical framework of  the neo-institutional studies in political 
science.  
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on the remaining asymmetric power of  SOEs in the commanding heights industries and 
government’s continuing favor to them as the role of  the owner of  SOEs.  
While North’s interpretations on institutions and path dependence are suitable 
for some static phenomena, Knight’s (1992, 127-135) theories are more powerful in 
explaining dynamic institutional changes as well as the bargain of  distributional benefits 
among actors. According to Knight, social actors produce social institutions in the 
process of  seeking distributional advantage in the conflict over substantive benefits. 
Those actors with a relative bargaining advantage can force others to comply with 
institutions. He argues that “the key feature of  the bargaining theory of  institutional 
emergence is the fundamental relationship between resource asymmetries, on the one 
hand, and credibility, risk aversion, and time preference, on the other”. Knight’s theories 
on the bargaining and asymmetries of  power assist studies based on his theories with 
directions to observe the institutional emergence (where there are distributional 
conflicts).  
Knight’s theory answers the question of, “how the constraints are generalized 
as a social institution governing the community as a whole” (127). His theory treats each 
player in the game of  gaining relative bargaining power equally. Within such a coherent 
community, differences of  players in categories like credibility, risk aversion and so forth, 
can be viewed as explanatory predictors for resources asymmetries. Therefore, for 
patterns of  an existing asymmetric relationship between actors like SOEs and PEs in 
China’s steel industry, his theoretic work provides key characters of  predictors to probe 
the resource asymmetries in the competition between actors.  
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B. Hypothesis 
Based on Knight’s theory, the research question in Part I of  this thesis can be 
re-phrased as: Which kind of  explanatory predictors in the community of  China’s steel 
industry causes resources asymmetries in the competitions between enterprises? I need to 
point out that, the community of  steel industries consists of  state-owner and private 
enterprises, yet their ownership is not the only tag that identifies one from each other.   
For the concept of  asymmetric resources in the competition, I first 
operationalize it as the production capacity that is strictly regulated by the NDRC. 
NDRC formulates industrial polices and coordinate the re-adjustment of  China’s 
industrial structure; it therefore has a target and official quota for the annual national 
steel production based on the industrial polices and re-adjustment. Based on the 
abundant consumption need of  domestic and international steel market predicted by 
Hogan (1999) and verified by the Fernandez’s empirical studies in 2007, the quota of  
production capacity become asymmetric resources in the competition for all enterprises 
in this industry without any doubt.   
This operationalization helps me break the research question into a couple of  
hypotheses. For each of  predictors, I can do hypothesis tests on its association with the 
response of  production capacity. North’s viewpoints on path dependence and Knight’s 
“credibility, risk aversion, and time preference” facilitate me with theoretical tools to find 
suitable concrete variables to operationalize explanatory predictors. I will mainly do 
qualitative studies with operationalization, measurements of  these predictors, and 
conduct statistical inference on hypothesis test results in details in the following part. 
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III. Application 
A. Operationalization, Measurement and Data Source 
Before I elaborate the application of  supporting theories, operationalization of  
the explanatory predictors should be defined for clearly illustrations. North uses 
transaction cost to explain the path dependence phenomenon in institutional changes. 
The path of  privatization of  state-owned enterprises, especially in heavy industries, is 
much rockier and slower than other economic factors. This is not only due their roles in 
controlling the national economy, but also a huge transaction cost of  removing the 
foundation stone of  “planned economy” in the authoritarian regime. As one of  the past 
and present commanding heights industries in China, ownership matters for steel 
enterprises in the relations with their supervisor and reaction towards the implements of  
industrial policies, even environmental policies (Kennedy, 2005). NDRC requires direct 
foreign investment to the steel industry in China to have joint-stock form with domestic 
capital, therefore, enterprises with foreign investment as categorized as PEs. In addition, 
township and village enterprises are also codes as PEs. Hence, I measure the variable of  
ownership as a dummy variable with two levels: state-owned and private. This variable is 
coded as 1 for SOE and 0 for PE. 
Secondly, I use a concept of  labor force proportion to operationalize the “risk 
aversion” in the relative bargaining power theory. Social stability is always a most 
important issue for the ruling party and central government. The political propaganda of  
“The overwhelming priority is stability” (wending shi yadao yiqie de qianti) is learnt not 
only from bloody confrontation between state and society in 1989, but societal 
grievances of  “laid-off” issues brought economic reform as well (Yang, 2002).The ruling 
authoritarian would rather pay the price of  economic stagnation if  necessary to relief  the 
agonies from a high unemployment rate (Gallagher, 2005). Since both actors (enterprises) 
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and external supervisor (government) are risk-averse, labor force proportion is selected 
as my second predictor. For the measurement of  this variable, I use an aggregate data 
(Manheim et. al., 2006). The number of  employees in the enterprise is the numerator and 
the denominator should be total labor force at local. Yet data of  total labor force at the 
region of  each enterprises are not available when I collected the data, instead I use the 
total number of  population in such regions from national census book, with an 
assumption of  approximate same rate of  labor force over whole population in each 
region. For enterprises whose major employees are from municipal, district and township 
level, I calculate the total number of  population in the region with corresponding level.  
A third predictor is the profit per capita of  each enterprise. That the economic 
performance is a vital essential to survive in the market economy has become a common 
sense for all the enterprises since the economic reform. The goal of  SOE reform is to 
make SOEs seekers of  profit maximization (Liu et. al., 2004). So I choose profit as an 
indicator to measure how competitive each enterprise is in term of  economic 
performance. According to the regulation from China’s State-owned Assets Supervision 
and Administration Commission (SASAC), SOEs have the responsibility of  handing 
partial of  their profit to their owner5 (state, that’s government in national, provincial or 
municipal level). Therefore, I calculate the value of  this variable for each observation 
with a total annual profit plus taxes of  the enterprise divided by the number of  
employees. The unit for this variable is millions of  Chinese RMB.    
The response, production capacity, is manually calculated based on information 
and rules learnt from field work. And its unit is millions of  ton of  crude steel. I went to 
three steel SOEs and one PE, interviewed with workers and management personnel in 
these enterprises, got access to the official Yearbook compiled by China Iron and Steel 
                                                        
5  Zhongyang Qiye Touzi Jiandu Guanli Zhanxing Banfa, published by Zhongguo Fazhi 
Chubanshe, 2006.  
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Association, and also learnt how to calculate a real production capacity of  each 
enterprise based on their descriptive reports on changes of  equipments for crude steel 
production. A real number and reported number sometimes have big differences and this 
is will further discussed later in the thesis. 
 
B. Descriptive Statics and Hypothesis Test 
My data was collected during the field work in summer 2008 and early spring 
2009 in China. All of  response and three predictors are for the market in the year of  
2004, which is one year after the end of  SOE reform. There are 64 observations in the 
data set and I get a list of  the name of  enterprises from the China Iron and Steel 
Yearbook 2005 (summaries of  the previous year of  2004). Two of  observations have 
missing data. Table 7 at Appendix has all 64 observations with four variables. 
Figure 1 
Histogram of  Response Production Capacity. 
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I make some histograms for the response and predictors for the descriptive 
statics. The outlier in the response in Figure 1 above, production capacity is Bao Steel, 
whose production capacity is 1514 million of  ton and be the largest steel enterprise in 
China. Located in Shanghai alone Yangtze River, it is also one of  three SOEs directly 
supervised by State Council.  
Bao Steel is also the outlier in Figure 2 below of  the predictor, profit per capita, 
with profit per capita of  1.662 million of  Chinese currency. Nanjing Steel in Jiangsu 
Province, which is also an SOE alone Yangtze River, gets the second place in profit per 
capita of  1.515 million of  Chinese currency. All other enterprises are at the level below 
1.0 million per capita and more than half  of  enterprises (exact number is 38) are in the 
range less than 0.1 million. 
Figure 2 
Histogram of  Predictor Profit per capita. 
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For the variable of  labor force proportion, I make both histogram and plot for 
the analysis. It is clearly there are three levels for values of  these variables. Zweig (2001) 
considers most of  remaining SOEs as large size as approximately 90% of  small and 
medium size SOEs are privatized since SOE reform in 1997, which brings pressures on 
solving a mass unemployment issue from SOE reform packages between 1998-2001.  
Figure 3 & 4 
Histogram of  Predictor Labor force Proportion (PO). 
Plot of  Labor force Proportion (ascending).  
  
 
 
For each level of  labor force proportion variable, I make further investigation 
on the ownership in Table 1 below. It is true that, there is no private enterprises at the 
category of  high labor force proportion. The outlier is Pan Steel with a rate of  0.154, a 
large SOE at Sichuan Province.  
I make a one-sided Fisher’s exact test (1922)6 with a hypothesis that “SOEs 
tend to have a higher level of  labor force proportion than PEs”. This test gets a p-value 
of  0.1336, which indicates I need to reject the hypothesis at 90% (let alone 95%) 
                                                        
6 This is a statistical significance test used in analysis of  contingency tables where sample sizes 
are small. The significance of  the deviation can be calculated exactly without approximation.   
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confidence level. So statistically, SOEs don’t have a higher level of  labor force 
proportion than PEs. 
Table 1 
 Labor force Proportion Total 
 Low (≤ 0.013) Medium (0.013, 0.05) High (≥ 0.05)  
State-owned Enterprises 25 18 8 51 
Private Enterprises 9 2 0 11 
Total 34 20 8 62 
 
I make a simple regression model of  response, production capacity, on three 
predictors, ownership, labor force proportion and profit per capita. I also add an 
interactive term of  ownership on profit per capita to this model. For the standard on 
model selection of  predictors, I would discuss in theory and statistically at section C in 
this part. Before move to section C, preliminarily statistical inferences are made below for 
getting an outline of  the model. 
Table 2 
Determinants of Production Capacity with an Interaction: Ownership interactive with Profit per 
capita. 
 
 
Table 2 above shows the regression results of  the model. It is clearly that both 
predictors of  labor force proportion and profit per capita have a strong linear 
relationship with the production capacity while the ownership itself  doesn’t account 
anything for gaining the bargaining power. However, the interaction of  ownership on 
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profit per capita matters at 95% confidence level. When an enterprise is a PE, one unit 
of  increase in profit per capita increases 1491 unit of  production capacity. The estimate 
of  coefficient for labor force proportion is the largest one, which is in good accordance 
with the overwhelming priority role of  social stability. For SOEs, the effect of  interaction 
nearly offsets the effect from the economic benefit, that’s to say, when an SOE earn one 
more unit of  profit per capita, this doesn’t contribute much for gaining more production 
capacity.  
 
C. Model Selection in Theory and Statistics   
There are three predictors for my model selection procedure and my selected 
one is:  
Production Capacity= 2.821+ 127.711× Ownership+ 4517.349× Labor Force 
Proportion+ 1984.168× Profit Per Capita- 1491.375× Ownership× Profit Per Capita 
I first make a model without interaction and the results are in Table 5 at 
Appendix. Estimates of  coefficients for labor force proportion and profit per capita are 
highly significant in that model and the p-value for the estimate of  coefficient of  
ownership is 0.833. Such a high p-value shows no influences of  ownership in gaining 
asymmetric resources, which is in contradiction with North’s path dependence theory on 
institutional change. Therefore, I try to add an interaction for ownership. The reason that 
I don’t choose an interaction on labor force proportion is because the association 
between ownership and labor force proportion. Although a p-value of  0.1336 in Fisher’s 
exact test for Table 1 doesn’t help me accept the null hypothesis of  “SOEs tend to have 
a higher level of  labor force proportion than PEs”, literatures (Zweig, 2001 and Yang, 
2002) still indicates some association between these two variables. 
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Besides the theoretical evidence for only one interaction, I also do some 
statistical tests to verify my judgment. For a full model with two interactions, ownership 
on both labor force proportion and profit per capita, I do an ANOVA (analysis of  
variance) test, F-test (Fox, 1997) to find a most fitted model for the data set. Table 6 in 
Appendix gives results of  this model. Akaike information criterion (AIC) measure the 
goodness of  fit of  an estimated statistical model and a model with lowest AIC value is 
preferred. Results in Table 3 indicate that the interaction of  ownership on proportion 
should be kicked out of  the model and a model with only interaction on profit per capita 
is preferred.  
Table 3  
Results of Drop Any Single Terms to this Full Model  
Model: 
Capacity~ Ownership+ Proportion+ Profit+ Ownership× Proportion+ Ownership× Profit 
 Sum of Square RSS AIC F-value p-value (>F ) 
<none>  3381513 688.22   
Ownership× Profit 39135 3420666 686.93 0.6481 0.424 
Ownership × Proportion 319526 3701057 691.81 5.2915 0.025 * 
* p≤ 0.05 
I also make an F-test in the Analysis of  Variance (Fox, 1997) to compare model 
without interaction (Model 1) and my selection model (Model 2) with one interaction of  
ownership on profit per capita in fitting my data set. The assumption is that, the Model 1 
in Table 4 fits the date set well and I want to test whether a new Model 2 describes the 
data set better than Model 1. A p-value of  0.030 supports the improvement of  Model 2 
performance better in explaining data set better than Model 1 at 95% confidence level.  
ANOVA in these two statistical tests support my theoretical analysis on the 
model selection.  
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Table 4 
F-test in Analysis of Variance  
Model 1: Capacity~ Ownership+ Proportion+ Profit 
Model 2: Capacity~ Ownership+ Proportion+ Profit+ Ownership× Profit 
 Residual D.F. RSS D.F. Sum of  Square F-value p-value (>F) 
Model 1 58 3718802     
Model 2 57 3420666 1 298136 4.968 0.030 * 
* p≤ 0.05 
 
D. Discussions 
Business-government relations are always widely discussed no matter in 
democracies or in socialist reforms. Although contemporary China’s steel industries do 
not have centralized bureaucratic management of  the market with government planners 
that used to happen in their “planned economy” before 1978, a remaining close 
relationship between SOEs and the government still exists due to complicated reasons 
which can be best summarized by North’s (1990) path dependence theory.  However, in 
the empirical examination, the direction is opposite to the common view.  It is the 
state-owned enterprises that lose relative bargaining power when they have economic 
improvements. During my filed work, most of  managers at SOEs complain about the 
dual-regulation on them from both local government and local State-owned Assets 
Supervision and Administration Commission. In most of  the cases for SOEs, their real 
production capacity is approximately same as the reported one on Yearbook. The 
number is quite different for PEs. Take Sha Steel in Jiangsu Province as an example, its 
real production is 1050 ten thousand of  tons while the one found in Yearbook is only 
950 ten thousand of  tons. Due to NDRC’s monitor on production capacity quota and 
environmental protection policy, steel enterprises are required to immediately terminate 
old, low-efficient furnaces and relevant equipments when they are approved to operate 
new, high-efficient ones with higher production capacity. As China’s largest private steel 
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enterprise and selective taxation contributor in Jiangsu Province, Sha Steel received 
relative loose supervisor from municipal NDRC de facto. Being a private enterprise gives 
Sha Steel the flexibility in operating both old and new furnaces at the same time and 
seizes more production capacities. PEs also take the advantage of  blind spot in their 
supervision with the trick7 like reporting a lagged schedule of  new furnaces and 
equipments. A manager at Ma Steel, a large SOE in Anhui Province, told me that, for 
large SOEs others than three of  them directly supervised from the SASAC of  the State 
Council (which is Bao Steel, An Steel and Wu Steel), NDRC, SASAC and government in 
each level like mother in-laws that you need to pay exceptional attention to.   
 
The core spirit of  “well managing large enterprises while adopting a flexible 
policy toward small ones” in the beginning of  SOE reforms treats the large SOEs and 
small-medium-sized SOEs separately. While CCP prefers to establish large SOEs into 
highly competitive large enterprises groups with trans-regional, inter-trade, 
cross-ownership and trans-national operations, they also quicken the pace in relaxing the 
control over small-medium-sized enterprises and invigorating them by way of  
reorganization, association, merger, leasing, contract operation, joint stock partnership or 
sell-off. CCP became more liberal in privatization of  the state-owned sectors and also 
was conscious with the forthcoming aftermaths of  bankruptcy, laid-off  workers and 
merger in the small-medium-sized SOEs, which brought problems of  mass 
unemployment at the first three years after 1997. The number of  establishment fell 
rapidly since 1998, mirroring the reduction in the number of  state-owned industrial 
establishments, the share of  gross industrial output accounted for by SOEs was falling. 
China’s old system of  state ownership was receding rapidly (Yusuf, Nabeshima, and 
                                                        
7 From  the interviews with a manger at Yong Steel, a township private enterprise in Jiangsu 
Province.  
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Perkins, 2006). For China’s steel industry, most of  large SOEs listed as the top ten steel 
industries by the China Metallurgical Enterprises Management Association8 were force 
to separated with their affiliated collective economy factories that produce low-end steel 
products to improve their own strength in the market. Those small-medium sized SOEs 
in China’s steel industry that used to get subsidy from large SOEs and the local 
government,9 were vulnerable in the market-oriented competition with a competitive 
mechanism selecting the superior and eliminating the inferior when government relaxed 
the control on them. Many were forced to quit the market or soon privatization. 
Situations are much better for PEs in the commanding heights domain. Some PEs 
emerge in the market through management buy-outs (MBO) and some are the township 
village enterprises (TVEs). Let me take Sha Steel I mentioned before for another 
example. Sha Steel was an iron and steel enterprise incorporated with self-financing in 
1975 and grew as a regional PE. The SOE reform gives it an opportunity to absorb 
international capitals, build the joint stock partnership with a foreign enterprise. Sha Steel 
developed dramatically and soon became a national key enterprise in 1999. Meanwhile, 
due its remarkable growth in its size (in terms of  number of  employees and production 
capacity) and high profits compared to other regional enterprises, Sha Steel grows to be 
more and more influential in regional economy: its former leader once selected to be one 
of  heads in the local municipal government. And the proposal for increasing to 1050 
millions of  ton production furnaces and equipment was approved at that time. 
 
                                                        
8 The former professional association of  China Iron & Steel Association. It is a weak 
professional association and are financially supported by both its member and the government.    
9 Xinhua She (News Anency), Wo Guo Guoyou Qiye Sannian Gaige Yu Tuopin de Licheng 
(Three Years of  China’s SOEs Reform and Poverty Elimination), Dec. 12, 2000, 
http://www.china.com.cn/chinese/2000/Dec/13585.htm 
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There are many standards to evaluate the efficiency of  an enterprise and this 
thesis concentrates on the separation of  enterprise from administration (Zhang, 1997). 
State-owned enterprises (guoyou qiye) used to be state-run enterprises (guoying qiye) in 
China under the old pattern of  the “planned economy” and the state held a dual-status 
of  both the owner and administrator of  the SOEs (Yang, 2004). Accordingly, SOEs also 
should take parts of  the government’s responsibilities for the welfare of  the whole 
societies, that nearly all of  them had affiliated public service units in health care and 
education (usually from kindergarten, elementary schools, middle schools to technician 
vocational schools). The SOE reform started since CCP’s 15th National Congress, 
especially the requirement on “separation of  enterprise and administration” helps SOEs 
negotiate with their local government and separate their sectors like hospital and schools 
from the enterprises in 1998. While SOEs sometimes are eager to fully concentrate on 
the corporation governance, local governments are reluctant to receive these public 
service units. As a return of  taking care of  the public sectors like hospitals and schools, 
SOEs also earn relative bargaining powers on distributional benefits, as an agent for local 
government, local NDRC sometimes turn a blind eye to the environmental protection 
problems and do political lobbying at provincial even state level for favored asymmetric 
resources like production capacity or low-rate loans. On the contrary, most of  PEs in the 
steel industry were more independent and flexible, and don’t meet with this kind of  
burden on their way to become modern enterprises in the market competition. 
Early case studies made by Steinfeld (1998) criticized ambiguous property 
rights of  SOEs and the absence of  the final authorized proxy in China’s steel industry 
reform. Aimed to solve this problem and build a clear principal-agent relation, the 
State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of  the State Council 
was set up in 2003 on the principle of  separating government administration from 
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enterprise management and separating ownership from management power, remaking 
Chinese Leviathan. SASAC performs the responsibility as the investor on behalf  of  the 
state; supervises and manages the state-owned assets of  enterprises according to law; 
guides and pushes forward the reform and restructuring of  SOEs. SASAC also directs 
and supervises the management work of  local state-owned assets. All others SOEs are 
administrated by provincial state-owned assets management authorities. This 
restructuring arrangement solves the problem in Steinfeld’s fieldwork to some extent but 
phenomenon of  the lack of  final authorized proxy of  the state-owned assets still exists. 
Nevertheless, the group of  formal institutions that separates administration from 
enterprises improves the enterprises efficiency and force SOEs to be more 
market-oriented and independent to survive in the competition with PEs, no longer 
playing a mixed role of  both the policy-maker (government) and policy-implementers 
(enterprises).   
IV. Conclusion 
The primary goal of  this thesis is to understand status quo of  competitions in 
on the steel industry after China’s SOE reform. More specifically, examine the effect of  
the SOE reform for a commanding heights industry on the distributional benefits within 
actors, does private enterprises gain relatively bargain power due to their role of  honest 
seekers of  profit maximization. And a simple answer is yes based on my analysis.    
To dissect this puzzle, I choose appropriate theories on institutions, 
operationalize concepts based on theories and literatures, conduction statistical 
regression for a fitted model and do post-test examination. This work treats the role of  
ownership equally to other fundamental explanatory variables. SOEs and PEs are 
combined to be a whole group for study. Within the theoretical frame of  relative 
bargaining power theory, both political logic of  decreasing transaction costs when 
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reforming formal “planned economy”, keeping social stability, as well as the economic 
logic of  seeking profit maximization are discussed in one model. I use quantitative data 
collected from field work and research with statistical inference while qualitative analysis 
from interviews for amendment of  the model. Different from previous work focus on 
business-government relations, NDRC is viewed as an external agent for the government; 
and the business actors of  enterprises are examined from three perspectives at the same 
time. The whole works can be viewed as a case study for analysis on the procedure of  
remaking “Chinese Leviathan” in decentralizing government and making economic 
transition under authoritarian regimes. 
Results of  the model are somehow different from my original prediction. 
Ownership matters when interactive with the economic performance of  enterprises in 
this heavy industry. However, the director is the opposite. It is the state-owned 
enterprises that lose relative bargaining power when they have economic improvements. 
Private enterprises usually become more flexible at provincial and municipal level and 
receive loose monitor due to the blind spot in their supervision. Strong PEs grow to seek 
for a solid positions in the business-government relations, especially at the local level 
where regional government paid more attention to short-run interests instead of  the 
label on the enterprises as state-owned ones or private ones. Empirical results of  the 
social stability reveal the nature of  authoritarian communism regime in prevention from 
turmoil brought by mass unemployment. Regardless of  ownership, enterprises do 
contributions on employment issue obviously gain relative more distributional benefits in 
seeking for bargaining power. 
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Appendix 
Table 5 
Determinants of Production Capacity without Interaction. 
 
 
Table 6 
Determinants of Production Capacity with Two Interactions: Ownership interactive with both 
Labor force Proportion and Profit per capita. 
 
 
Table 7  
List of All Steel Enterprises Recorded by Yearbook Compiled by China Iron and Steel 
Association in 2004.   
No. Ownership Capacity Employee Labor Portion  Profit* 
Per 
Capita  
1 SOE 1514 132057 4170000 0.03166835 219430 1.66163096  
2 SOE 1190 144400 1460000 0.09890411 108380 0.75055402  
3 SOE 1036 86604 5740000 0.0150878 10700 0.12355088  
4 SOE 1000 120000 10850000 0.01105991 36200 0.30166667  
5 SOE 903 62487 580000 0.10773621 6093 0.09750828  
6 SOE 850 48765 4320000 0.01128819 18730 0.38408695  
7 PE 1050 9500 860000 0.01104651 3746.8 0.3944  
8 SOE 710 46000 1970000 0.02335025 2330 0.05065217  
9 SOE 590 40458 3350000 0.01207701 783 0.0193534  
10 SOE 425 36613 1380000 0.02653116 29540 0.80681725  
 
 
 29 
11 SOE 680 36800 1240000 0.02967742 273 0.00741848  
12 SOE 620 68908 970000 0.07103918 28400 0.41214373  
13 SOE 507 71415 1420000 0.05029225 29530 0.41349856  
14 SOE 567 103345 670000 0.15424627 3110 0.03009338  
15 SOE 449 37913 1000000 0.037913 1699 0.04481312  
16 SOE 110 6368 7660000 0.00083133 883 0.13866206  
17 SOE 200 4807 4780000 0.00100565 735 0.15290202  
18 SOE 230 7083 560000 0.01264821 940 0.13271213  
19 SOE 72 61038 2710000 0.02252325 42870 0.70234936  
20 SOE 50 NA 5590000 NA 285 NA  
21 SOE 310 33712 1310000 0.02573435 15030 0.44583531  
22 SOE 70 10575 850000 0.01244118 3270 0.30921986  
23 SOE 600 16594 4880000 0.00340041 25140 1.51500542  
24 PE 94 3345 1170000 0.00285897 744 0.22242152  
25 SOE 99 10976 2760000 0.00397681 1738 0.15834548  
26 SOE 93 11265 280000 0.04023214 1254 0.11131824  
27 SOE 160 28751 780000 0.03686026 1025 0.03565093  
28 SOE 70 11261 2480000 0.00454073 1130 0.10034633  
29 SOE 50 10574 310000 0.03410968 650 0.06147153  
30 SOE 140 18667 1850000 0.01009027 1560 0.08356994  
31 SOE 35 6100 930000 0.00655914 324 0.05311475  
32 SOE 100 14787 4280000 0.00345491 685 0.04632447  
33 SOE 178.6 15887 890000 0.01785056 2136 0.13444955  
34 SOE 160 13865 960000 0.01444271 1273 0.09181392  
35 SOE 250 24790 10110000 0.00245203 1450 0.05849133  
36 SOE 260 24300 420000 0.05785714 113 0.00465021  
37 SOE 400 23053 270000 0.08538148 2052 0.08901228  
38 SOE 500 6284 160000 0.039275 1936 0.30808402  
39 SOE 135 18521 1720000 0.01076802 1599 0.08633443  
40 SOE 95 12374 7660000 0.0016154 802 0.06481332  
41 SOE 350 25000 380000 0.06578947 580 0.0232  
42 PE 300 18000 NA NA 2291 0.12727778  
43 SOE 300 33787 1150000 0.02938 1001 0.02962678  
44 PE 300 17742 450000 0.03942667 249 0.01403449  
45 PE 170 8000 2960000 0.0027027 263 0.032875  
46 PE 60 2000 380000 0.00526316 37 0.0185  
47 SOE 121 13666 1290000 0.0105938 750 0.05488073  
48 SOE 600 40000 970000 0.04123711 1001 0.025025  
49 SOE 185 11000 650000 0.01692308 1000 0.09090909  
50 SOE 229 4026 850000 0.00473647 2060 0.51167412  
51 SOE 200 6882 1770000 0.00388814 620 0.09009009  
52 PE 200 4600 860000 0.00534884 649 0.14108696  
53 PE 200 5600 860000 0.00651163 397 0.07089286  
54 PE 60 4881 1680000 0.00290536 138 0.02827289  
 
 
 30 
55 SOE 70 13455 1560000 0.008625 -191 -0.0141955  
56 PE 350 11642 810000 0.01437284 650 0.05583233  
57 SOE 180 10460 1800000 0.00581111 425 0.04063098  
58 PE 60 7900 960000 0.00822917 306 0.03873418  
59 SOE 160 5144 1240000 0.00414839 267 0.05190513  
60 PE 40 2542 810000 0.00313827 96.2 0.03784422  
61 SOE 300 19672 700000 0.02810286 1784 0.09068727  
62 SOE 120 18666 4520000 0.00412965 465 0.0249116  
63 SOE 65 17357 1990000 0.00872211 5 0.00028807  
64 SOE 45 6805 780000 0.00872436 195 0.0286554  
 
Note:  1. * Profit is recorded in currency unit by every million of  Chinese RMB. Portion and Per 
Capita in the table are calculated by Labor and Profit over Employee respectively.  2. Out of  64 
observations, there are two observations (obs #20, #42) have missing data. 
Source:  1. 2005 Nian Zhongguo Gangtie Gongye Nianjian.  2. Zhonghua Renming Gongheguo 
Xingzheng Quhua Jiance 2005.  3. Fieldwork of  data collection and interviews in An Steel 
(Liaoning), Bao Steel (Shanghai), Sha Steel (Jiangsu) and Ma Steel (Anhui) in 2008. 
 
